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This paper proposes a novel one-time password (OTP) mutual authentication scheme
based on challenge/response mechanisms. In the scheme, random sub-passwords and
corresponding hashes are shared between a user and a server, respectively. By performing
modular algebraic operations on two or more randomly chosen sub-passwords, relatively
independent OTPs can be produced in the scheme. The used sub-passwords are renewed
according to random permutation functions. With tens of random sub-passwords, we can
get enough OTPs that can meet the practical needs. The stores and calculations can be
implemented with a microcomputer in the user’s terminal. At the same time, the scheme
can provide suﬃcient security in ordinary applications.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
With the development of the computer and the Internet, various types of electronic communications and transactions
appear, such as online banking, online money transfers and online trading. Today, they have become an essential part of
our lives. However, almost all of them are operated over insecure networks. Such insecure networks may be intrusioned
by hackers and other unauthorized users. This may lead legitimate users to disclose their private information or lose their
properties.
Many popular authentication methods are often used to improve the security of communications over insecure networks,
such as passwords, digital signatures, smart cards, and ﬁngerprints. Among these methods, the password authentication is
regarded as the simplest and most convenient one [1]. The password is a secret word, or string of characters that is used for
authentication. The conventional static passwords are quite common for very low-cost provision and no need for the user to
carry another device. However, they are prone to password-guessing attacks, because the user often select the password so
that it can be easily memorized [2]. They are also in the threats of disclosure and line eavesdropping, both of which allow
subsequent replay [3]. To overcome this problem, Lamport initially proposed a one-time password (OTP) authentication
scheme using hash functions [4]. Such passwords are used only once and then thrown away. Later, Haller reﬁned it to the
S/KEY standard [5]. Subsequently, many other OTP authentication schemes have been proposed to improve the security,
reduce the cost or increase eﬃciency [2,6–11]. Generally, these schemes generate a new password either based on the
previous one using a mathematical algorithm, or based on time/sequence synchronization, or based on a challenge and
a counter again using a mathematical algorithm [10], where a typical mathematical algorithm is a hash function algorithm.
However, some practical diﬃculties may exist in these schemes, such as the high hash overhead, the need of time/sequence
synchronization, the necessity for password resetting, and the dependence among OTPs.
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scheme. In our scheme, with performing modular algebraic operations on two or more randomly chosen sub-passwords
from tens of random sub-passwords, one can easily produce relatively independent OTPs. At the same time, the scheme can
give suﬃcient security to protect the personal information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the related notations and basic concepts. In
Section 3, we introduce the related work. In Section 4, we present our OTP mutual authentication scheme. In Section 5,
we show the BAN logic analysis for our protocol. In Section 6, we discuss the properties of produced OTPs and analyze the
security of the scheme. In Section 7, we compare our scheme with others. At last, in Section 8 we draw a conclusion about
the scheme.
2. Notations and basic concepts
2.1. Notations
For simplicity, frequently used notations and the corresponding descriptions are listed below.
S: the server,
U : the user,
ID: the distinct identity of U ,
h(·): a pubic collision-free one-way hash function,
h(KEY, ·): a hash function with a key value KEY ,
nonce: a pseudorandom integer sequence,
Pst : the static password of U ,
P sn: the nth sub-password,
Pou : the one-time password produced by U ,
Pos : the one-time password produced by S ,
K : the total number of possible characters of sub-passwords,
L: the length of the sub-password,
N: the total number of all sub-passwords,
N: the ﬁnite integer set {1,2, . . . ,N},
SN0 : an original sequence (1,2, . . . ,N),
Π(·): a random permutation function for SN0 ,
SK0 : an original sequence (1,2, . . . , K ),
πm(·): the mth random permutation function for SK0 ,
M: the total number of all πm(·),
A ⇒ B: x A sends x to B through a secure channel,
A → B: x A sends x to B through a common channel.
2.2. Basic concepts
Our proposed scheme will employ two basic concepts, i.e., one-way hash functions and random permutation functions.
In the following, we brieﬂy describe them, respectively.
2.2.1. One-way hash function
A one-way hash function h = h(x) is an algorithm which maps messages x into a ﬁxed string of digits, usually for security
or data management purposes. It usually has three properties [11]. The ﬁrst main property is one-wayness. Given x, it easily
to compute a hash value h(x), but given a hash value h(x), it is very diﬃcult to ﬁnd the message x. The second property is
that the output will not give any information even part of the input. The third property is collision resistant, i.e., it is hard
to ﬁnd two messages x1 = x2 with H(x1) = H(x2). There are many algorithms for one-way hash functions, such as Message
Digests (MD4, MD5), Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512). As known to all, hash
functions may be used with or without a key. If a key is used, both symmetric (single secret key) and asymmetric keys
(public/private key pairs) may be used. A naive method to hash the message x with a key is h(KEY, x) [11].
2.2.2. Random permutation function
A permutation function π on N is a bijection from N to itself, i.e., π(N→N): j = π(i), i, j ∈N [3]. A random permuta-
tion can produce a random ordering sequence for an original sequence SN0 . One method of generating a random permutation
for the sequence SN is to generate a sequence by taking a random number between 1 and N sequentially, ensuring that0
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a random ordering sequence S= (3,5,1,2,4) is obtained with the permutation function π .
3. Related work
The hash and the random permutation functions are two important encryption functions in modern cryptography [3,11].
Since the two functions are easy to calculate, they are often used in various cryptographic constructs, such as data en-
cryption and digital signatures. Hash functions have been extensively used to generate OPTs [4–7]. Random permutation
functions also been used in various protocols. For example, Shamir proposed a zero-knowledge identiﬁcation protocol [12].
Wong et al. introduced a password-keyed permutation family to capture the features of the password related operations in
a password authenticated key exchange scheme [13]. Recently, with a random permutation function, Catuogno and Galdi
proposed and evaluated the security of a two-factor graphical password scheme [14].
On the other hand, some strong authentication protocols have used challenge/response mechanisms [15], in which one
party presents a question (challenge) and the other party must provide a valid answer (response) to be authenticated [3,16].
The mechanism is often used in OTP schemes [4–7]. Using the mechanism, it can easily implement mutual authentication
between U and S .
In detail, we will review three typical OTP schemes. The ﬁrst one is Lamport’s Scheme [4]. In the scheme, a hash chain,
h1(w),h2(w), . . . ,hn(w), . . . ,hℵ−1(w),hℵ(w), is formed as a hash function h(·) is applied for ℵ times to a secret key w .
In the tth time authentication, the server S sends a challenge ℵ − t to the user U . Then U calculates the tth time OTP
Pou = hℵ−t(w) using a microcomputer and sends it to S as a response. The identify of U is authenticated by S with checking
h(Pou) = hℵ−t+1(w), where hℵ−t+1(w) is the t − 1th OTP is already saved in S side at the t − 1th authentication. After a
successful authentication, both S and U increase t by one. However, it is vulnerable to the small challenge attack [17].
The second one is Yeh–Shen–Hwang’s Scheme [6], which is composed of Registration phase, Login phase and Authenti-
cation phase. In Registration phase, S issues a smart card to U . The card contains a pre-shared secret w , a large random
number ℵ (a permitted number of login times), w ⊕ D0, and H(D0), where D0 is a random number. Once receiving them,
U can extract D0 by performing XOR operation on w ⊕ D0 and D0. D0 is hashed one time and compared with the H(D0).
The identity of S is authenticated if they are same. Then U computes the initial password p0 = Hℵ(Ku ⊕ w) and U ⇒ S:
p0 ⊕ w , where Ku is the private secret of U . In Login phase, S → U : Ct ,w ⊕ Dt and H(Dt) ⊕ pt−1, i.e., S sends these chal-
lenge values to U . Here Dt is a random number generated by S , pt−1 = Hℵ−(t−1)(Ku ⊕ w) and Ct = ℵ − t . Similarly as that
in Registration phase, the identify of S can be authenticated by U . Then U → S: pt ⊕ Dt , i.e., S responses S with pt ⊕ Dt ;
In Authentication phase, S can obtains pt by performing the XOR operation on pt ⊕ Dt and Dt . Then pt is hashed one time
and compared with pt−1. If they are same, the identity of U is authenticated by S . After the successful authentication, S
and U replace pt−1 and Ct−1 with pt and Ct , respectively. However, it is vulnerable to the stolen-veriﬁer attack [18].
The third one is Eldefrawy et al.’s Scheme [7] using nested hash chains. There are two phases, which are Regis-
tration phase, and Login and Authentication phase. In Registration phase, U and S share wOTP0 ,w
Auth
0 ,hA(·) and hB(·),
where wOTP0 and w
Auth
0 are the OTP seed and the authentication seed, respectively. U stores them in his token. In Lo-
gin and Authentication phase, S → U : (vt,1, vt,2), i.e., S sends these challenge values to U , where (vt,1, vt,2) = ((xt , yt) ⊕
hB(h2A(w
Auth
2t−1)),w
Auth
2t−1 ⊕ hB(hA(wAuth2t−1))) and (xt , yt) are random integers generated by S . The (xt , yt) values are the chal-
lenge core. Once receiving them, U can check whether vt,2 ⊕ hB(hA(wAuth2t−1)) is equal to wAuth2t−1, where U has stored
wAuth2t−1 at last authentication. The identify of S can be authenticated by U with positive results. After the successful au-
thentication, U extracts (xt , yt) = vt,1 ⊕ hB(h2A(wAuth2t−1)). U calculates the tth OTP pt = hytB (hxtA (wOTPt )). U and S update
wAuth2t = h2AwAuth2t−1, respectively. Then U responses S with wt = pt ⊕hB(hA(wAuth2t )). Receiving the response, S checks whether
pt = wt ⊕ hB(hA(wAuth2t )). S checks whether wOTPt+1 = hxtA (wOTPt ). If the two results are positive, the identify of U can be au-
thenticated by S . After the successful authentication, U and S update wAuth2t+1 = hA(wAuth2t ), respectively.
4. Our proposed scheme
In this section, we will describe our scheme ﬁrst. Then, we will give an example to illustrate the scheme.
4.1. The scheme
There are three phases in our scheme, i.e., the Registration phase, the Login/Authentication phase and the Sub-password
change phase. The Registration phase is performed only once, and the Login/Authentication phase is executed every time a
user logs into the system. The Sub-password change phase is invoked after every login request is accepted.
4.1.1. Registration phase
In this phase, everyone who wants to register at the server should have a microcomputer. U can freely select or change
his/her personal identiﬁcation number (PIN) for the microcomputer.
(1) U freely chooses his/her ID and Pst , then U ⇒ S: ID and P .
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U to choose his/her ID again until the chosen ID is unique.
(3) S generates random P sn = (C1n ,C2n , . . . ,Cln, . . . ,C Ln) with a physical random number source, where Cln is a character and
n = 1,2, . . . ,N . S generates a KEY for hash functions. S ⇒ U : P s1, P s2, . . . , P sN and KEY . S stores KEY and U stores
P s1, P
s
2, . . . , P
s
N and KEY , respectively.
(4) S generates a random permutation function Π for an original sequence SN0 with a physical random number source,
which gives the mappings n˜ = Π(n). S stores the random permutation function Π and P sn˜ , where n˜ = 1,2, . . . ,N .
(5) S generates different random permutation functions π1,π2, . . . ,πm, . . . ,πM for an original sequence SK0 with physical
random numbers sources, which gives the mappings k˜ = πm(k). S ⇒ U : π1,π2, . . . ,πK . S and U store π1,π2, . . . ,πK ,
respectively.
4.1.2. Login/Authentication phase
In this phase, U has to send a login request message to S whenever U wants to log in.
(1) U keys PIN on his/her microcomputer.
(2) U generates the pseudorandom integer sequence nonce = (n1,n2, . . . ,nm, . . . ,nM) based on a mathematical algorithm
using his/her microcomputer [19], where 1 nm  N . U calculates Z =∑Mm=1 P snm mod K , and gets Pou = h(KEY, Z).
(3) U → S: ID, P , nonce, i.e., U sends a challenge value nonce to S .
(4) Upon the receiving login message, S checks ID and the corresponding P . If it is invalid, the login request is rejected.
(5) S computes n′m = Π(nm) for m = 1,2, . . . ,M and gets nonce′ = (n′1,n′2, . . . ,n′m, . . . ,n′M). S calculates Z ′ =
∑M
m=1 P sn′m
mod K , and gets Pos = h(KEY, Z ′).
(6) S generates pseudorandom integer numbers n˜once = (˜n1, n˜2, . . . , n˜m, . . . , n˜M) based on a mathematical algorithm. S cal-
culates n˜′m = Π(˜nm) for m = 1,2, . . . ,M and gets n˜once′ = (˜n′1, n˜′2, . . . , n˜′m, . . . , n˜′M). S calculates Z˜ ′ =
∑M
m=1 P sn˜′m mod K ,
and gets P˜ os = h(KEY, Z˜ ′).
(7) S → U : Pos and n˜once, i.e., S responses U with Pos and sends a challenge value n˜once to U .
(8) U checks whether Pou is equal to P
o
s . If they are not equal to each other, U cancels the login.
(9) U computes Z˜ =∑Mm=1 P sn˜m mod K with his/her microcomputer, and gets P˜ ou = h(KEY, Z˜). U → S: P˜ ou , i.e., U responses
S with P˜ ou .
(10) U stores a few last (nonce, Pou) and (n˜once, p˜
o
u).
(11) S checks whether P˜ os is equal to P˜
o
u . The login request is accepted only if they are identical.
4.1.3. Sub-password change phase
After every login request is accepted, S and U change their sub-passwords, respectively.
For U :
(1) According to nonce = (n1,n2, . . . ,nm, . . . ,nM) and Pou , U computes P ′ snm = Pou − P snm mod K . Based on the random per-
mutation function πm , P snm is renewed by πm(P
′ s
nm ) for all m.
(2) According to n˜once = (˜n1, n˜2, . . . , n˜m, . . . , n˜M) and P˜ ou , U computes P ′ sn˜m = P˜ ou − P sn˜m mod K . Based on the random per-
mutation function πm , P sn˜m is renewed by πm(P
′ s
n˜m
) for all m.
(3) S increases his counter value Tu by one after the successful authentication.
For S:
S renews his/her sub-passwords similarly as that for U . At the same time, S increases his counter value Ts by one after
the successful authentication.
Counter resynchronization:
Some reasons will lead to Tu = Ts . For example, U forgets to employ Sub-password change phase, U employ it consecutive
twice, or S cannot successfully transport the message that “the login request is accepted” to U . The three steps that U does
are reversible, therefore with the knowledgement about a few last (nonce, Pou) and (n˜once, p˜
o
u), U can make Tu = Ts .
4.2. An example
To make the idea concise and clear, we illustrate our scheme in Fig. 1. It shows that for U , the OTPs Pou and p˜
o
u are
generated from sub-passwords P s1, P
s
2, . . . , P
s
N based on challenge values nonce and n˜once, respectively. The sub-passwords
P s1, P
s
2, . . . , P
s
N dynamically change based on nonce and n˜once after every successful authentication. For S , it is similar as
that for U . The hash functions, random permutation functions and modular algebraic operations are also used. They server
as secrets between U and S . The mutual authentication is achieved in our scheme.
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We provide a numeric example to demonstrate how to generate OTPs in our scheme. In practice, we use the HMAC-
MD5 algorithm to calculate hash value and we denote h′(KEY, Z) to it. Then we choose certain bits from it to get the OTP.
Assume that the sub-password P sn is made of 10 digit characters, i.e., 0–9. The password lengths L = 6. We choose that
N = 5, M = 2, K = 9, KEY = 426310, π1 = (7,2,1,5,3,8,6,0,9,4) and π2 = (4,0,7,3,1,6,8,2,5,9). For simplicity, only
partial steps and only what U does are given.
Registration phase: P s1 = 765901, P s2 = 961088, P s3 = 730912, P s4 = 137336 and P s5 = 544323.
Login/authentication phase: nonce = (4,3), Z = 867348, h′(KEY, Z) = 5b6b7 f 5a5ef 132971e20ddc1ba64 f d89, Pou =
314213.
Sub-password change phase: P s1 = 765901, P s2 = 961088, P s3 = 621740, P s4 = 106906, P s5 = 544323.
5. BAN logic analysis of our protocol
It is well known that BAN logic [20] is a popular method to analyze authentication protocols [21,22], which provides a
formal method of reasoning the beliefs of participant in a security protocol. In the section, we will prove the security of our
protocol with it.
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BAN logical notation used in our paper as follows:
• P |≡ X : P believes in X ;
• P  X : someone has sent P a message containing X ;
• P |∼ X : P sent a message containing X and, by the time P sent it, P believed in it;
• (X): X has not been sent any time before the current run of the protocol. Usually, X is a nonce;
• P K↔ Q : K is a good key for P and Q to communicate;
• P X↔ Q : X is a shared secret known only to P and Q ;
• {X}K : X encrypted with key K . Note that encryption is idealized in the sense that algebraic properties of different
cryptosystems are not considered;
• 〈X〉Y : X combined with Y so that Y ’s presence proves the identity of whoever uttered X .
5.2. Original protocol
From Section 4 and Fig. 1, the message sequence in Login/Authentication phase are as follows:
Message 1: U → S: ID, Pst , nonce;
Message 2: S → U : Pos , n˜once;
Message 3: U → S: P˜ ou .
In Message 1, U sends ID, Pst and nonce to S stating a login request. The nonce is a sequence random number. U chal-
lenges S with nonce. And S responds U with Pos in the second message according to their shared secrets, i.e., sub-passwords
based on received nonce. At the same time, in Message 2, S sends a challenge value n˜once to U , and U responds with P˜ ou in
the third message according to their shared sub-passwords.
5.3. Idealized protocol
To express our protocol in standard notation, we use A and B to represent U and S , respectively. We use Yst , Na and
Nb to represent Pst ,nonce and n˜once, respectively. We also use Kab and K ′ab to represent the algorithm of obtaining OTPs,
shared sub-passwords, hash functions, modular algebraic operation, and random permutation functions, which act as shared
keys between U and S . The corresponding {Na}Kab and {Nb}K ′ab represent Pos and P˜ ou , respectively. The cleartext ID is omitted
as they do not contribute to the logical properties of our protocol. The idealized protocol is as follows:
M1: A → B: 〈Na〉Yst ;
M2: B → A: {Na}Kab , 〈Nb〉{Na}Kab ;
M3: A → B: {Nb}K ′ab .
5.4. Security goals
The protocol is intended to provide a means for a user A and a server B to authenticate with each other using chal-
lenge/response mechanisms. That is:
G1: B |≡ A |∼ Na;
G2: A |≡ B |≡ Na;
G3: A |≡ B |∼ Nb;
G4: B |≡ A |≡ Nb .
G1 means that B believes the challenge Na from A, and B responses A with {Na}Kab . In other words, A believes that B
believes the Na , i.e., G2. The meanings of G3 and G4 are similar as that for G1 and G2, respectively.
5.5. Initiative assumptions
To analyze our protocol, we ﬁrst give the following assumptions:
A1: A |≡ A Yst↔ B;
A2: B |≡ A Yst↔ B;
A3: A |≡ A Kab↔ B;
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A4: B |≡ A Kab↔ B;
A5: A |≡ A K
′
ab↔ B;
A6: B |≡ A K
′
ab↔ B;
A7: A |≡ (Na);
A8: B |≡ (Nb).
5.6. Protocol analysis
We now proceed with the analysis.
• A2 gives that B |≡ A Yst↔ B and M1 means that B  〈Na〉Yst . We apply them on the message-meaning rule for shared
secretes [20,21] that P |≡P
Y↔ Q ,P〈X〉Y
P |≡Q |∼X , and then obtain the belief G1 : B |≡ A |∼ Na .
• A3 gives that A |≡ A Kab↔ B and M2 means that A  {Na}Kab . We apply them on the message-meaning rule for shared
keys [20,21] that P |≡P
K↔ Q ,P{X}K
P |≡Q |∼X , and then get the result that A |≡ B |∼ Na . At the same time, A7 gives the result that
A |≡ (Na). We apply the two results on the nonce-veriﬁcation rule [20,21] that P |≡(X),P |≡Q |∼XP |≡Q |≡X , and then obtain the
belief G2 : A |≡ B |≡ Na .
• A7 also means A |≡ Na , and A3 also means A |≡ Kab . We apply the belief-concatenation rule [20,21] and obtain A |≡
{Na}Kab . M2 means that B |≡{Na}Kab . Therefore {Na}Kab can be as a shared secret known only to A and B . Then similarly
as that in the above, the beliefs G3 : A |≡ B |∼ Nb and G4 : B |≡ A |≡ Nb can also be obtained.
6. Discussion and security analysis
The sub-password P sn = (C1n ,C2n , . . . ,Cln, . . . ,C Ln) is made of characters, which are from certain groups, e.g., 10 digit char-
acters (0–9), 26 low case alphabet characters (a − z), 26 upper case alphabet characters (A − Z) [23]. The total number
of possible characters of sub-passwords K depends on the chosen character groups, which may be equal to 36, 62 or oth-
ers. In practice [24], most password lengths L are in the range [6,10], therefore, L ∈ [6,10] is recommended. Based on
nonce = (n1,n2, . . . ,nm, . . . ,nM), M sub-passwords are randomly chosen from all N sub-passwords to produce a OTP Pou
and a OTP Pos .
In the following, we present the simulated results for the scheme proposed in Section 4. We suppose Pot =
(C1t ,C
2
t , . . . ,C
l
t , . . . ,C
L
t ) is the tth time OTP, where t = 1,2, . . . , T . We choose Clt ∈ {0,1, . . . ,9,a, . . . , z}, i.e., K = 36. The
condition that L = 8, M = 4 and T = 106 is as an example. Let us ﬁrst consider the probability distribution function
P (Cb,Ca) for all Pot . Assume Ω(C
l
t+1 = Cb,Clt = Ca) is the occur time that Clt+1 = Cb and Clt = Ca for all T OTPs, the
probability distribution function
P (Cb,Ca) =
Ω(Clt+1 = Cb,Clt = Ca)∑
C ′b,C
′
a
Ω(Clt+1 = C ′b,Clt = C ′a)
. (1)
If the OTPs is completely random, for inﬁnite OTPs, P (Cb,Ca) = 11296 at K = 36. Fig. 2 shows the variations of P (Cb,Ca) with
Cb at Ca = 9 for N = 5,10,50 and 100, respectively. For other Ca , the results are similar. For comparison, the ﬁgure also
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OTPs, respectively.
gives P (Cb,Ca) for randomly-produced OTPs, in which Clt is randomly chosen from the character set {0,1, . . . ,9,a, . . . , z}.
The line in the ﬁgure is for the function P (Cb,Ca) = 136 . We ﬁnd all P (Cb,Ca) ﬂuctuate near the value 136 . The large N ,
the ﬂuctuation of P (Cb,Ca) is nearer that for randomly-produced OTPs. On the whole, for N > 10, the ﬂuctuations are
almost in the same order as that for randomly-produced OTPs. Let us consider the other quantity, i.e., the correlation
function C(t) for all Pot . In numerical calculations, the character set {0,1, . . . ,9,a, . . . , z} is mapped to the numerical set
{ 136 , 236 , . . . , 1036 , 1136 , . . . , 3636 }. We deﬁne the correlation function
C(t) = 〈CltClt+t
〉− 〈(Clt
)2〉
, (2)
where the bracket denotes average over all possible t . Fig. 3 shows the variations of C(t) with t at for N = 5,10,50,100
and for randomly-produced OTPs, respectively. We ﬁnd C(t) are very small and ﬂuctuate near zero for all t . Therefore,
from the properties of P (Cb,Ca) and C(t), we ﬁnd there are almost no correlations between OTPs. With tens of random
sub-passwords, we can get almost random OTPs.
On the other hand, in our scheme, it performs simple modular algebraic operations and only needs one time hash
operation to produce OTPs, which makes the calculation cost low. The counter synchronization is easily operated by U . In
our simulations, we generate 106 OTPs and do not ﬁnd a repeater, which means that we needn’t reset the original conditions
of U and S .
As each password is used only once, our scheme is safe from passive adversaries who eavesdrop and later attempt
impersonation [3], i.e., Eavesdropping Attack and Replay Attack. At the same time, our scheme has most predominant se-
curity properties [2]. For examples, we apply random permutation functions to renew sub-passwords, the produced OTPs
are almost completely random, therefore our scheme is resistance to Password Guessing Attacks. We propose the mutual au-
thentication here, so it is resistance to Masquerade/Impersonation Attack/Forgery Attack. The order of sub-passwords for S is
different from that for U , hash functions are used and sub-passwords will be renewed after every successful authentica-
tion, therefore it is resistance to Stolen-Veriﬁer Attacks. In our scheme, U should click a PIN code to his/her microcomputer,
at some time U can intentionally make his/her microcomputer lose synchronization and operates it synchronization when
he/she uses it, and U should send a static password to S , thus the scheme can resist Microcomputer Lost Attack. There is
no correlation between OTPs, so it can resist Small Challenge Attack. The keyed hash functions and the random permutation
functions are used and they can be taken as the non-repudiation evidence.
7. Comparisons
The comparisons of our scheme and three related schemes [4,6,7] are summarized in Table 1. The corresponding three
schemes have been reviewed in Section 3. Table 1 shows that devices are needed and challenge/response mechanisms are
used in all the four schemes. Except Lamport’s Scheme, Mutual authentication is used in the other three schemes. Password
resetting is necessary in Lamport’s Scheme and Yeh–Shen–Hwang’s Scheme, but it is not in Eldefrawy et al.’s Scheme and
our scheme. Comparing with other three schemes, the hash cost and the dependence among OTPs are very low in our
scheme.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a robust and eﬃcient OTP mutual authentication scheme based on challenge/response mecha-
nisms. With tens of shared random sub-passwords, OTPs are produced. The sub-passwords and corresponding hash functions
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Comparisons among OTP schemes.
Scheme
Feature Device Challenge\
response
Mutual
authentication
Password
resetting
Hash
cost
Dependence
among OTPs
Lamport’s Scheme [4] Yes Yes No Yes High High
Yeh–Shen–Hwang’s Scheme [6] Yes Yes Yes Yes High High
Eldefrawy et al.’s Scheme [7] Yes Yes Yes No High Middle
Our proposed scheme Yes Yes Yes No Low Low
with a key are stored in U and S , respectively. These sub-passwords that randomly chosen to produce OTPs are renewed
according to random permutation functions. With the simulations, we certify these OTPs are almost independent. There are
other advantages of our scheme. For examples, the calculation cost is low. The counter synchronization is easily operated
by U . It needn’t reset the original conditions of U and S . At the same time, our scheme can resist many attacks, such as
Eavesdropping Attack, Replay Attack, Password Guessing Attacks, Masquerade/Impersonation Attack/Forgery Attack, Stolen-Veriﬁer
Attacks, Microcomputer Lost Attack, Small Challenge Attack and Repudiation Attack.
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